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So ist die Scham gleichsam die Puppenhülle,
in der die Geschlechtsliebe bis zu jener Reife
wächst, in der sie die Scham durchbricht.1
1. Introduction
Scheler’s 1913 essay on shame is largely overlooked today.2  Its at times
outright  sexist  and  chauvinist  speculations,  together  with  an
ominously  racist  rhetoric,  provide  reason  enough  for  some
contemporary scholars to be wary of the value of devoting precious
research time to it.3  For Anglophone scholars,  the lack of a readily
available,  contemporary  translation  of  the  essay  also  undoubtedly
contributes  to  its  neglect  today.4  Some  of  Scheler’s  observations,
moreover,  are  bound  to  appear  puzzling,  thanks  to  differences  in
languages and eras. The fact,  for example,  that  Scham, the word for
shame in German, can stand for genitalia as well as for a feeling of
shame,  introduces  a  bevy  of  word-associations  and  word-
combinations, the likes of which are not to be found in contemporary
English. A Brit’s experience of shame today may differ markedly from
what a contemporary of Oscar Wilde or D. H. Lawrence understood as
a shameful experience, let alone what Scheler understood by a «feeling
of shame» (Schamgefühl) around the same time.5  Along with  today’s
1 SCHELER 1957, 130.  
2 The list of secondary literature on Max Scheler since 2000, compiled by the Max Scheler
Gesellschaft, contains 288 entries, only two of which (BERNET 2003, TEDESCHINI 2012) are
devoted to Scheler’s essay on shame. For an earlier essay in English on Scheler’s essay,
see EMAD 1972; for a more recent treatment in English, see ZAHAVI 2010.  Scheler’s essay is
often cited (BROUCEK 199, 111-4; TAYLOR 1985, 60f; LANSKY & MORRISON, 253, 256; WILLIAMS
1993, 220; NUSSBAUM 2004, 174, 186; DEONNA ET AL., 2011, 150f), but rarely studied.
3 For a single passage that puts all these tendencies on display, see SCHELER 1957, 131f.
4 Manfred  Frings’  translation  of  the  essay  as «Shame  and  Feelings  of  Modesty»  (see
SCHELER 1987, 1-85) is currently out of print. 
5 Wilde, The Young King: «Through our sunless lanes creeps Poverty with her hungry eyes,
and Sin with his sodden face follows close behind her.  Misery wakes us in the morning
and Shame sits with us at night». Wilde, The Ballad of Reading Gaol: «And once, or twice,
to throw the dice is a gentlemanly game, But he does not win who plays with Sin in the
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ever-fading sense  of  «sin» (freely associated with shame by Scheler
and  Wilde  alike),  a  century  of  psychological,  sociological,  and
ethnological  research  separates  us  from  Scheler’s  observations.   In
certain respects at least, considerably more is known today about the
phenomena  associated  with  shame  than  was  known  when  Scheler
penned Scham und Schamgefühl.
Yet, for all its outrageous speculations and outdated claims, Scheler’s
essay on shame remains a classic study of the subject. As I hope to
show, it is worthy of close scrutiny, in part for its highly differentiated
descriptions of experiences of shame and for its attempt to weave these
descriptions together into a general theory.  In that theory he lays out
what  he  takes  to  be  shame’s  basic  precondition,  its  structure  and
fundamental  dynamic,  and  the  law  ultimately  governing  that
dynamic.  He also identifies its affective character and basic forms. The
result is a formidable account of the scope of shame-phenomena that
is  as brash and controversial  as it  is  untimely today. The following
paper is an attempt to review Scheler’s analysis of shame under four
aspects.  I  aim  to  identify  both  its  potential  contributions  to
understanding  shame  and  some  basic  difficulties  besetting  the
analysis.6 
The  four  aspects  of  shame  concern  the  structure,  dynamic,
affectivity, and explanation of shame, according to Scheler’s account.
By  the  structure of  shame,  I  mean  its  make-up,  including  the
components  and  relations  that  enter  into  the  experience.  By  the
dynamic of shame, I have in mind how it takes place and the principle
governing that process. By the affectivity of shame, I have in mind the
answer to the question of what it feels like to feel shame (as well as
whether it is a basic sort of feeling or made up of more basic sorts of
secret house of shame».
6 The paper is thus undertaken with the conviction that critical investigation of Scheler’s
analyses and inferences, particularly where they are controversial, has the potential to
draw us closer to core features of the phenomena, across eras and linguistic cultures. But
the paper by no means provides a full-scale critical investigation of this sort.  Its aim is
the more modest one of preparing the way for that sort of investigation by reviewing
some basic strengths and weaknesses (including ambiguities and discrepancies) of his
account.  
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experience or feelings). By the explanation of shame, I mean answers to
questions of why we feel shame at all. Addressing these aspects and
answering  the  relevant  questions  are  not  peculiar  to  Scheler’s
examination of shame, but his approach to them is distinctive (and,
indeed, in one crucial respect largely counter-intuitive). 
The following review begins with (1) Scheler’s accounts of shame’s
basic condition, the law ultimately governing its origin, and its basic
dynamic.  This  first  part  of  the  paper  accordingly  addresses  the
structural and dynamic aspects of shame, on his account. The paper
then turns to (2) his general descriptions of what we feel when we feel
shame and his analyses of two distinct forms of shame (and how the
latter correspond to two of the four distinct species of feelings that he
identifies).7 This  second  part  of  the  paper  addresses  the  affective
aspect of shame. In conclusion, I attempt to draw these aspects of his
account of shame together to illustrate why, according to Scheler, we
feel shame and how his account contributes to a broader discussion of
issues surrounding the phenomenology and explanation of shame.
7 There are several aspects of Scheler’s account that, in the interest of economy, I can no
more than signal  here,  including his  loose speculations about  shame’s  preconditions
(SCHELER 1957, 70-4), his comparisons and contrasts of shame with related feelings such
as pride, humility, and disgust (SCHELER 1957, 81-88) as well as emotions with which it is
often confused, such as prudery, cynicism, obscenity (SCHELER 1957, 93-6), his account of
both  the  functions  of  the  feeling  of  sexual  shame  (SCHELER 1957,  106-44)  and  the
differences between the feeling in females and in males (SCHELER 1957, 145-7). The central
precondition is individualization (individual preservation and valuation) that – hand in
hand with sexual differentiation and drives – supersedes functions identifiable solely
with reproducing the species.  Noting the difference, even anatomically, of the place of
the reproductive parts of plants and animals (the more hidden placement of the latter),
Scheler further links this aspect to the subordination of sexuality to the whole of a life,
adding that this subordination might even be designated « an objective phenomenon of
shame» (SCHELER 1957, 74). As for the functions of the feeling of sexual shame, its primary
function is to inhibit autoeroticism, while promoting sympathetic, other-related sexual
feelings; its second function is to postpone satisfaction, thereby allegedly enabling racially
optimal, noble offspring as well as an intensification of the sex drive and its satisfaction;
and its third function is to contribute to the sexual act itself.
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1.   Shame’s  basic  condition,  the  ultimate  law  of  its
origin, and its basic dynamic
Shame is an individual, paradigmatically human experience. There is,
Scheler  declares,  «no  clearer,  no  sharper,  and no  more  immediate»
expression of the human condition, situated as it is between the divine
and the brute.  Shame is inherent to being human precisely because
human  beings  are  the  bridge  (the  transition,  the  point  of  contact)
between the essential and the actual.8  Inherent to this human position
midway between God and other animals is «the basic condition of the
essence of the feeling of shame»: a consciousness that is luminous –
i.e., that represents a surplus phenomenon opposite all life’s needs and
is freed from merely illuminating vital reactions to the environment –
yet bound to the life of an organism.9  
Having outlined this basic condition of shame, Scheler identifies the
law ultimately  governing  its  origin,  across  all  its  forms.   Shame is
possible whenever the attention of someone immersed in an activity
that  is  not  purely  biological  (e.g.,  art,  love,  mathematics)  suddenly
turns back to the body that obscurely accompanies that activity. Since
our  attention  can  obviously  turn  from  the  activity  to  our  bodies
without us feeling shame in the process, this experience is not itself
shame but opens up a sphere in which shame can occur. The sphere is
one of conflict (Widerstreit) – the conflict of an act’s essential claim and
genuine meaning with the concrete and actual manner of its  existence
(again, reflecting the underlying condition in the case of shame).  A
specific form of this experience of conflict is the root of «that obscure
and remarkable  feeling of  shame» and its  attendant  experiences  of
bewilderment  (Verwunderung),  confusion  (Verwirrung),  and  that  of
opposition between what ideally ought to be and what factually is the
case.   An  unbalanced  and  unharmonious  relation  between  bodily
8 Shame is tied to the essentially human feeling of being a bridge between two orders of
reality (Sein und Wesen); «No God and no animal can feel shame» but, precisely as this
Übergang, human beings must (SCHELER 1957, 69).
9  SCHELER 1957, 67.
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neediness and claims not confined to bodily needs is, he iterates, an
inherent part of « the basic condition of the origin of this feeling».10 As
Scheler puts it, because we’re more than our bodies, we can feel shame;
but because we are bodies we must feel shame.11 
These  observations,  lifted  from  the  opening  remarks  of  Scheler’s
essay, begin to provide answers to the questions of the  structure  and
process of shame. The basic condition of the experience of shame is the
human bridging of two distinct, equally inherent yet conflicting levels
of living.  Shame is based, in other words, on the structural difference
between  some  pursuit  or  behavior  and  its  underpinnings.   Those
underpinnings are purely biological in the case of sexual shame, as
well  as  in instances  of  non-sexual  shame,  such as  child’s  shame in
soiling  her  pants  (encopresis).  Equivalently  (not  identically),  the
contrast is  between a higher, more differentiated, and individualized
activity  or  state  and  a  lower,  less  differentiated,  and  more  generic
activity or state.  The dynamic of feeling shame is a sudden shift in
awareness from the former to the latter, tantamount to a shift from a
sense  of  what  ought  to  be  (or  at  least  what  someone  individually
strives  for)  to  a  sense  of  what  is  (as  part  of  the  same individual’s
generic  condition).  A  person  may  feel  shame,  for  example,  upon
realizing  that  she  is  «putting  on  airs»,  thereby  violating  the
authenticity to which she aspires.  Herein lies the dynamic of shame,
how  it  takes  place  and the  principle  –  Scheler  calls  it  the  «law»  –
governing the process.  
Throughout  his  account,  Scheler  exploits  the  double  meaning  of
«shame»  which  refers  at  once  to  the  experience  or  «stirring»  as  a
feeling  and  to  the  distinctive  intentionality  or  directedness  of  the
10 Scheler  speaks  of  a  disharmony between the sense  and claim of  the  human being’s
«spiritual person and his bodily neediness» (seiner geistigen Person und seiner leiblichen
Bedürftigkeit)  (SCHELER 1957,  69).  However,  since he subsequently distinguishes bodily
shame  from  spiritual  shame,  this  formulation  appears  to  overreach,  though  it  is
admittedly made by way of introduction.
11 Thus, human beings in some cultures cover up their genitals even when the weather
does not require that they do so. As Scheler puts it, «the most primitive form of clothing»
arises from shame and not vice versa (SCHELER 1957, 75).
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feeling.12 He  has  in  mind  the  German  equivalent  to  the  difference
between feeling ashamed and feeling ashamed of or for something.13
But the intentionality of shame is by no means indiscriminate; that is
to say, it is not directed at just anything. A further marker of feelings of
shame (at once structural and dynamic) is the fact that they belong to
the sphere of self-directed feelings. «In all shame, an act occurs that I
would  like  to  call  a  turning  back  to  the  self».14 The  feeling  calls  our
attention back to some aspect of ourselves (or, as we shall shortly see,
some self), particularly after we have been immersed in some activity.
Scheler gives the helpful example of a lover who, having been caught
up in acts of expressing his love to his beloved, finds himself abruptly
taken aback with shame when his body makes him all too aware of his
purely sensual intentions. Another one of Scheler’s oft-cited examples
is that of a model who, in the course of posing in the nude, detects
what  she  takes  to  be  the  painter’s  lustful  glance,  a  prompt  that
suddenly makes her aware simply of her body.15 Her shame is a feeling
of protecting herself, her value as an individual, from urges that are all
too common, i.e., universal and vulgar (allgemein and gemein).16 
As long as the model considered herself merely as a model and not
as an object of desire,  she would not feel shame. So, too, if she felt
12 Scheler criticizes positivist thinkers for confusing the forms of the expression of shame
with the feeling itself  (SCHELER 1957, 76). But this distinction is also not the same as the
distinction between the stirring of the feeling and the self to whom it is directed.  While
shame requires  both  the  stirring and that  directedness,  it  can  be directed at  oneself
(when we are ashamed of ourselves) or the self of someone else (when we are ashamed
for someone else). 
13 Scheler may have mind the fact that we can feel ashamed without automatically knowing
what it is about or for whom we feel shame. In those cases, we may, upon reflection,
come to see for whom we feel shame. But Scheler’s point seems to be that, explicitly or
not, shame is directed at a personal self, usually but by no means invariably, one’s own
personal self. In this sense at least, shame is inherently intentional. 
14 SCHELER 1957, 78.
15 SCHELER 1957,  78-9.  Other  examples:  a  patient  who  feels  no  shame  as  long  as  she
considers herself  to be regarded by the physician as a token of a type and not as an
individual;  a  lover  who  reacts  with  shame  to  the  beloved’s  declaration  «you  are  a
beautiful woman», which she takes to be comparing her to others (though context may
well dictate whether she takes it as signaling her individuality).
16 For justification of this double entendre, see SCHELER 1957, 131.  
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herself  merely as an object of  desire,  there would be no shame. As
noted  above,  the  feeling  of  shame  requires,  as  its  basic  structural
condition,  a  conflict  between two levels  of  living;  for  example,  one
confined to the body and its needs, and another that is not. But the
conflict must be lived; it is a dynamic process. Shame sets in, not when
one is regarded either as something generic or as an individual, but
when, in the face of one of these ways of being regarded, one turns
back  to  oneself  as  someone  who  can  rightly  be  regarded  in  the
opposite way. 
Shame begins in the dynamic of that turning back to the self
that enters neither if one knows oneself given as something
universal  nor  if  one  knows  oneself  given as  something
individual.  Instead,  that  turn  back  to  the  self  makes  its
appearance if the palpable intention of the other  oscillates
between  an  individualizing  and  universalizing  view
[Meinen]  and if  one’s  own intention and the  experienced
counter-intention, with respect to this difference, move, not
in the same, but in opposed directions.17
Consider, once again, Scheler’s example of the model. She feels that
she is  given to the painter both as an individual (indeed, a unique
subject)  and  as  something  universal  (or,  more  to  the  point,  as
something quite common); his intentions are palpable to her. At the
same time, as his intentions swing in one direction, hers swing in the
opposite direction. The moment he regards her not as an individual
but  as  something  common,  she  feels  herself  (her  value)  as  an
individual threatened. That feeling is a feeling of shame. To illustrate
this point further, Scheler notes how, «in a completely analogous way»,
we already feel a kind of «gentle shame» the moment we characterize
one  of  our  own,  individual  experiences  in  general  terms  such  as
«sympathy» or «love», thereby lending our consciousness a kind of
publicity «to  which those completely  individual  experiences  belong
17 SCHELER 1957, 79. 
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just as little as our private lives belong in the newspapers».18 
Shame, so conceived, is by no means limited to or even originating in
sexual life,  despite being deeply intertwined with sexuality.  Indeed,
sexual life is in a sense paradigmatic for shame precisely because it is
at once the most general aspect of our lives (shared with animals, with
everything alive) yet also the most highly individual aspect «insofar as
[…] there is no judge of any sort other than the sentiment [Empfindung]
itself».19 Sexual shame accordingly presents itself as a consequence of
two basic movements: a movement of the generic, purely sensuous sex
drive and a movement of love on some level, at once individualized,
value-directed, and – perhaps above all – devoted to the beloved. Here,
once  again,  for  shame  to  occur,  one  has  to  be  capable  of  both
movements and the «experienced tension» between them. The tension
is  present  since  the  move  to  one  side  remains  accompanied  by  «a
strong  undercurrent  of  attraction to  the  matter  against  which  it
strives».20 The  experience  of  this  tension,  inherent  in  the  feeling  of
shame, flags its complexity (a point further addressed below). 
Scheler further underscores the point that shame is not exclusively
sexual by calling attention to the fact that it  is not even exclusively
social.  To  the  extent  that  the  ultimate  judge  is  the  individual’s
sentiment itself (as noted above), the presence of others is obviously
dispensable.  Indeed, the experience of feeling shame in private,  i.e.,
apart from the actual presence of other people, is hardly a rarity. As
Scheler puts it, shame in our own eyes – «in the face of» (vor) ourselves
– is no less basic than shame in the face of others. Yet the fact that a
person privately experiences shame hardly diminishes its dependence
upon some sort  of  real  or imagined interaction.   In such cases,  the
individual is simply taking the place of others. Scheler’s own examples
– an adolescent ashamed of her body parts, a person shamefully using
discretion to pry into someone’s secrets – confirm this intersubjective
dimension, as does his description of the painter’s «palpable [fühlbare]
18 SCHELER 1957, 79f.
19 SCHELER 1957, 80.
20 SCHELER 1957, 84.
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intention», palpable, that is, to the model. The preposition vor (“in the
face  of,”  “before”)  expresses  a  duality  in  the  structure  of  shame,  a
difference between the one who is ashamed and the one before whom
she is ashamed. Scheler could have expressed himself more clearly on
this point but the gloss presented here is consistent with his insistence
that without love (sexual or spiritual),  i.e.,  intersubjectivity in some
sense, there is no shame («one of the profoundest and the most natural
aides to love»).21 
Shame is intentional in two senses; it is directed at both the object of
the feeling and the basis for the feeling (more clumsily, why the shame
is felt,  for what or about what I  feel shame).  Sometimes these two
senses  are  collapsed into  the same expression.  In some uses  of  the
locution «I am ashamed of myself», for example, the genitive (of) can
indicate that I am the object and the basis of the shame. In that case,
something  about  me is  the  basis  of  the  shame,  i.e.,  for  what  I  am
ashamed. But these two senses can also be expressed in a way that
differentiates them, as in the locution «I am ashamed of myself  for
being  a  certain  way  or  doing  something»,  e.g.,  for  boasting,
exaggerating.  (Scheler also recognizes that there is an aboutness built
into a derivative feeling of shame, what he deems «repentant shame»,
discussed below.22) Another sort of the dual intentionality is, it bears
adding, already present in the structural condition and dynamics of
shame,  since  shame involves  turning  to  oneself  precisely  –  indeed,
alternately – as an individual and as something generic.23
At  the  same  time,  as  already  mentioned,  shame  remains  a  self-
directed feeling (Selbstgefühl).  Scheler points out, however, that it need
21 SCHELER 1957, 82, 97, 137.  SCHELER’S remark about publicity and the newspapers, cited
above, strongly suggests that,  in his view, something of this sort,  i.e.,  some level and
mode of intersubjectivity, is inherent to the experience of shame.  My gloss on this point
differs  from both Emad’s and Zahavi’s interpretations  (EMAD 1972, 362;  ZAHAVI 2010,
216f; ZAHAVI 2017, 215). 
22 SCHELER 1957, 141. 
23 Scheler does not himself draw out this dual intentional aspect and his invocation of the
feature  expressed  by  the  « about »  (über)  is  ambiguous.   To  this  extent,  since  these
features of shame seem to be common to the feeling, I  am trying to give a generous
interpretation of his account in this respect.
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not refer to the individual self of the one who is ashamed.24 We can
also be ashamed of others and, in a different  way,  for others. Perhaps
the most typical experience of being ashamed of others involves some
shared identity with them.  We regard what they did, for example, as
demeaning of the group to which we both belong.  We might say, for
example, «I am ashamed of you as a member of our team», meaning
that their activity brought dishonor upon the team. In such a case, we
may be submitting that the person ought to feel  shame even if  she
does not. The situation is different when we feel shame for someone
else with whom we do not identify. Here, too, the person may or may
not experience the shame herself.  Indeed, we may or may not expect
the person to  feel  shame.  To illustrate this  sort  of  scenario,  Scheler
gives the example of feeling shame and blushing if an off-color story is
said in the presence of a lady but feeling no such thing if it is told in
her absence.  The shame is for her, even if she has no such feelings.  
From Scheler’s interpretation of this fact,  he makes two important
and controversial inferences.   He infers first  that shame is generally
directed at a self, indeed, any self. Here one might hesitate to accept
this conclusion since it appears to rule out the commonplace of being
ashamed of a collective (e.g., a nation, a political party or movement, a
group or team). He also infers – no less controversially – that shame is
not «a quality of feeling that attaches to the ego». His point is that I do
not  experience  the  feeling  of  shame  as  something  related  to  me
(Ichbezogenheit) in the way that I experience and can perhaps share the
experience of melancholy or joy. In contrast to suffering or delighting,
we do not empathize with others (or at the very least not in the same
way) when it comes to shame. The feeling of shame about something
makes a demand quite independently of such an individual condition
of the ego (individueller Ichzustand).  
24 Scheler takes note of «shame before oneself» (Scham vor sich selbst) and «being ashamed
of  oneself»  (Sichschämen  vor  sich  selbst)  (SCHELER 1957,  78).  Presumably,  he  means
something  like  the  following.  We may experience  shame directed  at  ourselves  (e.g.,
someone else being ashamed of us or our recognition that something about ourselves is
an object of shame, even if we are not ashamed) or we may be ourselves ashamed of
ourselves. 
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The basic phenomenon lies rather in being ashamed that is
always a being ashamed about something and is related to a
state  of  affairs that  “demands”  it  of  itself  and  completely
independently of the condition of our individual ego.  This
“being-ashamed”  is  an  emotional  movement  of  a  sui
generis sort that does not entail being ashamed  of oneself,
that  is  to  say,  it  does  not  entail  any experience  of  being
related, in the feeling, to the I, let alone the fact that I am
ashamed “about” myself.25  
This detachment from how I otherwise feel personally, i.e., from the
condition of my ego, explains why, Scheler adds (quoting Petrarch),
the feeling of shame uniquely «wells up» and «overcomes» us.  
This second inference seems to overreach, though it is hard to deny
that  Scheler  has  his  finger  here  on  something  distinctive  if  elusive
about shame. He is certainly right to claim that I can feel shame for
someone else in the sense he describes  without feeling ashamed of
myself in the same way. But is shame then as impersonal as his gloss
suggests? Is that feeling of shame not vicarious in some sense, such
that it could be shared empathically with someone else? In the setting
described above, isn’t the feeling sometimes as contagious for others
(including the lady herself) as the blushing? And don’t feelings of joy
and melancholy well up in us just as much as shame does before we
manage, if at all, to get a handle on them?  
2.  Shame’s complexity and basic forms
According  to  Scheler,  shame is  a  not  a  sensation  (Empfindung)  like
seeing  or  hearing,  but  a  feeling  (Gefühl).  In  general,  feelings  are
25 SCHELER 1957, 81. The observation about the necessity of being «about something» in this
passage  further  supports  the  claim,  made  above,  that  shame  is  intentional  in  two
respects, being directed at some self as its object and at some basis (being ashamed for or
about something).  
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experiences that  are far more intimately bound up with the person
having  the  experience  than  are  experiences  of  sensing,  imagining,
thinking, or willing (presumably even if in the case of shame, as he
claims, the feeling is also impersonal, i.e., detached in a certain sense
from the condition of the ego). What someone feels is as much a part
of her as the act of feeling, something that cannot be said for what she
sees (or thinks) and the act of seeing (or thinking). Because a person
lacks this  distance from her feelings,  she is  accordingly less able to
control or manage her feelings at will (Scheler 1921, 344f).
The  complexity  of  the  affective  character  of  shame,  as  Scheler
interprets  it,  presents two sorts  of  phenomenological  difficulties.  In
this  section  I  address  (2.1)  this  complexity  and  the  challenges
introduced by it, before turning to (2.2) Scheler’s differentiation of the
two basic forms of shame in terms of his taxonomy of feelings.
2.1 The complex affectivity of shame
The basic condition of shame is, as noted, a conflict between two levels
of living, a conflict that is experienced as a tension, pulling us in two
directions at once. Given this tension and the ways of feeling it, the
affective character of shame is complex to the point of challenging the
notion  that  shame can  be  described  as  a  single  specific  or  unified
phenomenon.  Scheler  makes  four  relevant  observations  that
underscore  the  complexity  of  shame.  He  describes  the  feeling  of
shame as (1) an individual’s feeling of protecting herself (Schutzgefühl)
and her «individual value against the entire sphere of the universal»
(Scheler  1957,  80).  The  idea  that  shame  is  a  protective  feeling
corresponds  to  the  notion  that  it  has  a  certain  potency,  capable  of
rising – to a degree – above the  tension. Thus, it is «passionate» and
powerful enough at times to put up resistance against «lower» urges,
i.e., inclinations to act in purely generic ways and thereby surrender
strictly personal (individual) meaning and value (a process patently
recognizable  in  both  bodily  and  spiritual  shame).26 It  is  even  a
26 SCHELER 1957, 124, 130, 132. Williams inherits this account of shame as « an emotion of
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commanding feeling, i.e., a source of commands, enjoining us against
succumbing to those urges.27 So, too, Scheler refers to its «restraining
force», capable of inhibiting or curbing various appetites until, as he
colorfully puts it, love breaks through.28
Of course, the impulse to protect entails a sense of something worthy
of protection. Shame accordingly also involves (2) a feeling of the value
of oneself (Selbstwertgefühl), a feeling akin to (but, nonetheless, distinct
from) the related feeling of honor (Ehrgefühl).29 Shame, on this account,
includes an individual’s  feeling of  her own unique value combined
with  the  feeling  of  safeguarding  –  and  being  able  to  safeguard  –
herself and this value against the threat of being solely defined by the
very same universal  (generic,  public)  characteristics  that  admittedly
co-define who she is.  
In keeping with the basic condition of shame and the ultimate law of
its origin, we have the feeling of protecting ourselves precisely because
we also have feelings that identify us with the universal (including the
connotation of  the  common or  vulgar).  As a  result,  we have every
reason to be fearful or anxious of the prospect of losing ourselves, our
value  as  individuals,  to  the  universal  dimensions  that  we  –  quite
literally – embody. Scheler accordingly also characterizes shame as (3)
an individual’s feeling of something «akin to anxiety» (gleichsam Angst)
about sinking down into lower values. As such, shame is the feeling
that comes of the «reaction against» (Gegenreaktion) the universal and
generic.30 
Those universal and generic elements are, it bears stressing, felt by
self-protection » from Taylor who appropriates it from Scheler’s notion of  Schutzgefühl;
SCHELER 1957,  80;  WILLIAMS 1993,  220f;  TAYLOR 1985,  60f.   Williams  does  not  use  the
expression « negative feeling », but he does regard it as a reaction to a consciousness of a
loss of power, as viewed by an internalized viewer or witness, a reaction that presumably
(in contrast to guilt) need not involve fear at the internalized viewer’s anger.
27 SCHELER 1957, 140.
28 SCHELER 1957, 130; see, too, the opening quotation of the present essay.
29 SCHELER 1957, 82.
30 While  likening shame to  Angst,  Scheler  also  distinguishes  it  from Angst,  albeit  –  in
contrast  to  the  difference between shame and fear  (Furcht)  –  without  explaining the
distinction in detail; see SCHELER 1957, 80, 88.
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the individual as hers no less than the feelings she deems and values
as uniquely hers. The individual is, in that sense, accountable for those
feelings – the very feelings against which she seeks to protect herself.
In view of this last consideration, it is not surprising to find Scheler
characterizing the feeling of  shame as (4)  an individual’s  feeling of
accountability  (Schuldgefühl).31 One  could  also  translate  Schuld  as
«guilt»  but  guilt  suggests  responsibility  that  may,  but  need  not,
accompany shame. I am not responsible for my sexual urges (i.e., I did
not choose to have them), even though I am accountable for them (i.e.,
they are mine).  
The  characteristically  anxious,  and  accountable  feeling  of  shame,
strongly protective of the worth of the self to whom it is directed, is
apparent in sexual shame. Sexual shame is anxious about protecting
the  individual  value  of  love  from  succumbing  to  purely  sensual,
common  desires,  for  which  the  individual  herself  is  nonetheless
accountable. As Scheler aptly puts it, shame is «love’s conscience».32 To
be sure, how these different aspects come together into one feeling of
shame is  by no means obvious.  Feeling the  value of  ourselves  and
feeling protective of it are one thing, feeling anxious and accountable,
quite another. At best, if we countenance these different feelings and
their role in shame, it seems that shame is a complex, episodic feeling
that runs the gamut of feelings of strength and worth, anxiousness and
accountability.  
A  further  difficulty  arising  from  Scheler’s  account  of  shame’s
affective  character  is  his  contention that,  far  from  being a  negative
feeling, it is a «positive feeling of the value of oneself» which it shares
with pride. Scheler is not speaking simply of the meaning or import of
shame, but of the feeling itself.33 In contrast to humility, for example, in
shame an individual’s «positive worthiness» is given to him. Does that
mean a feeling that is closer to something joyful and uplifting than
feelings of sadness and dejection? Scheler does not say as much but if
31 SCHELER 1957, 81.
32 SCHELER 1957, 124.
33 Thus he chides educational theories for attributing only a negative meaning to shame
(SCHELER 1957, 98).
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so, his account differs from most standard, contemporary treatments
and,  indeed,  definitions  of  shame.34  Scheler  himself  distinguishes
shame from repentance (Reue), a negative feeling, directed at some loss
of value (some negative value), which seems, indeed, to coincide with
those standard conceptions of shame.  
Matters  in  this  regard  are  complicated,  however,  since  Scheler
himself recognizes the existence of an intermediate sort of shame that
often combines with the feeling of the repentant. Recalling the double
sense of «shame». i.e., signifying both the stirring of the feeling and
the  object/direction  of  the  feeling  (e.g.,  one’s  own  self  or  that  of
someone else), he notes how being ashamed of oneself can coincide
with  a  sense  of  being  repentant.  A  person  experiences  this
intermediate shame when, for example, she feels the disgracefulness
(Schande) of lying. Although repentance is directed at some  negative
value, the latter can apparently coincide with an intermediate form of
shame,  presumably  in  the  sense  that  she  can  feel  ashamed  and
repentant for something she did because she also feels her self-worth
and the need to be protective of it. Why call it «intermediate»? Perhaps
because  pure  shame is  the  feeling that  she  is  better  than that,  i.e.,
better  than  what  the  object  of  repentance  and intermediate  shame
indicates. 
Still,  the very idea that shame in some genuine or pure form is a
positive feeling has to strike contemporary readers as counterintuitive.
«Feelings of shame» typically designate unpleasant experiences, even
if  those  experiences  in some sense suppose a positive sense of  our
worth as individuals. Moreover, even though, as discussed in the next
section, pleasure and pain belong to a class of feelings different from
feelings of shame, Scheler does not shy away from characterizing the
feeling of shame in these terms. Thus, he distinguishes the extremely
painful,  «burning  shame»  that  accompanies  repentance  from  the
«warm and often even pleasure-accentuated» experience of shame as
34 According to OED, shame is  «the painful  emotion arising from the consciousness  of
something dishonoring, ridiculous, or indecorous in one’s conduct or circumstances [...],
or of being in a situation which offends one’s sense of modesty or decency». See, too,
GIDDENS 1991, 64; TRACY & ROBINS 2007, 13. 
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the immediate, protective, and anticipatory feeling we have in relation
to a sexual coupling «not guided by a decided love». Penitential shame
(Schamreue)  consists  in «looking back and seeing a  transgression of
what  the  feeling  of  shame  in  the  latter  [more  positive]  sense  had
forbidden».35
Yet the example of an experience of shame colored or accentuated in
a  pleasant  way (lustbetont)  provides  an  important  clue  to  Scheler’s
otherwise counter-intuitive claim about the positive character of the
feeling of shame.  Genuine sexual shame – not to be confused with
prudery,  coyness,  or  coquetry  –  amplifies  a  sense  of  well-being,
precisely by contributing to the possibility and anticipation of sexual
love. The climactic yet lasting joy of that love, a joy that is global and
shared,  bringing  two entire  bodies  and  lives  together,  requires  the
restraint that is joyful because, though the love is still undecided, the
shame beckons to it.  Scheler seems to have this sort of experience in
mind when he claims that «genuine shame is constantly built upon the
sensation  of  a  positive  value  of  oneself».36 Yet  even  if  this
interpretation of  sexual  shame is  countenanced,  the  question of  its
generalizability remains. 
2.2 The forms and feelings of shame 
Scheler introduces two forms of shame – bodily shame and soulful
shame  –  corresponding  to  two  different  sorts  of  feelings  –  a  vital
feeling and a spiritual feeling – respectively. In Der Formalismus in der
Ethik und die materiale Wertethik (drafted roughly the same time as the
study  of  shame),  he  uses  similar  terminology  in  the  course  of
differentiating four irreducible sorts of feelings: 
(1) sensory feelings (Empfindungsgefühle); 
(2) vital  feelings  (Lebensgefühle)  or,  perhaps  more
informatively, feelings of being alive, feelings of vitality or,
35 SCHELER 1957, 83, 140. 
36 SCHELER 1957, 100.
Metodo Vol. 5, n. 1 (2017)
256                                                                                    Daniel O. Dahlstrom
equivalently,  someone’s  feelings  of  her  body as  a  whole
(Leibgefühl) and of herself as a body (Leibich); 
(3) soulful feelings (seelische Gefühle), i.e., feelings pertaining to
someone’s psyche or, alternatively, feelings someone has of
herself as an ego (Ichgefühle); and 
(4) spiritual feelings (geistige Gefühle).  
Vital feelings stand for Scheler in sharp contrast to sensory feelings.37
A  sensory  feeling  –  e.g.,  pain  (Schmerz),  not  to  be  confused  with
suffering (Leid) – is a mere condition of a part of the body. As such, it is
both  localized  and  transient,  completely  absorbed  in  the  present.
Unlike functions or intentional acts, it is not itself meaningfully related
to anything  beyond itself.  By  contrast,  in  addition to  being  neither
transient nor confined to a particular part of the body,38 vital feelings
are wrapped up in a nexus of meaning and value involving the past
and  future  (memories  and  anticipations)  as  well  as  relations  to
(feelings for)  other things (in the case of  bodily shame, relations to
others).39 Vital feelings (e.g., contentment, weariness, vigor), moreover,
are directly personal (clinging to the ego) in a way that cannot be said
for  sensory  feelings,  a  fact  that  also  explains  why,  Scheler  adds,
sensory feelings  are  more  subject  to  control  (e.g.,  by removing  the
relevant stimulus). Vital feelings cannot produce or eliminate sensory
feelings, but they can control or inhibit them. Thus, the vital feeling of
sexual shame curbs purely sensory, sexually gratifying feelings.40
Vital feelings are at the same time bodily feelings. That is to say, part
of their make-up is a consciousness of oneness with our body (jenes
einheitliches  Bewußtsein  unseres  Leibes).  The  same cannot  be  said  for
soulful feelings, such as sadness, grief, or joy.41 These soulful feelings
37 On the non-intentionality of Empfindungsgefühle, see STUMPF 1997 (1907).
38 In English as in German, we do not ask where the shame is in the way that we ask where
it hurts.
39 SCHELER 1921, 353: «Was aber von ganz besonderer Bedeutung ist, ist die Tatsache, dass
schon das Lebensgefühl, nicht erst die geistigen Gefühle, der Funktion des Nachfühlens
und Mitfühlens teilhaftig ist».
40 SCHELER 1957, 107.
41 SCHELER 1957,  106.  This  sense  of  oneness  is  not  to  be  confused  with  a  fusion
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pertain not to the ego as a body, but to the ego simply, albeit to varying
degrees.  This  « layer »  of  feelings  can  combine,  to  be  sure,  with
different  layers  and  degrees  of  sensory  and  bodily  feelings,  but
without surrendering – short of mental illness – its sui generis status.
For example,  only someone  out of kilter would consistently confuse
being sad with being weary.  
«Spiritual feelings», the final category of feelings, designate feelings
such as serenity or despair.  These sorts of feelings differ from soulful
feelings precisely by superseding the realm of anything given to the
ego, for which (or for the value of which) the ego is in some sense
responsible. They take such complete possession of someone that it is
a  misnomer  to  say  that  she  experiences  them  in  the  way  she
experiences pain or sadness. Their value is the absolute value of the
person herself, not a value relative to or dependent upon something
the person knows or does.42 
Lining  up  Scheler’s  account  of  shame’s  basic  forms  with  this
taxonomy  of  feelings  presents  a  problem.  Whereas  Scheler
understands bodily shame as a vital feeling, he characterizes the other
form of shame in terms that cut across the last two sorts of feelings.
Thus, he differentiates bodily shame from shame that he describes as
soulful and spiritual. However, as should be evident from his account of
the latter sort of shame, he seems to regard it as a kind of soulful (not
spiritual) feeling.
In any case, both forms of shame suppose its pre-condition, a conflict
between  higher,  value-determining  and  lower,  value-indifferent
functions,  and  they  are  alike  experiences  of  the  tension  of  the
unresolved character of that conflict. So, too, each form exists solely
within  a  sphere  in  which  someone  shelters  her  self-worth  as  an
(Verschmelzung) of sensory feelings and sensations, Scheler contends, not least since a
positive vital  feeling can  be combined with negative sensory feelings  (SCHELER 1921,
352).
42 Forming the correlate of the ethical value of the person’s very being itself (beyond any
relation to community, friends, state, and so on), these feelings are «metaphysical and
religious  self-feelings»  (SCHELER 1921,  356).  The role  of  clothing is  accordingly based
upon shame, since the genitals remind him of his body and his sexual functions when he
aspires to more.
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individual,  protecting it  from absorption into any purely generic or
universal dimension, where she is nothing more than a token of type.43 
The difference between the two forms – bodily shame and spiritual
shame – lies in the composition of the sides making up their respective
conflicts.  Bodily shame is  the index of  the tension between “value-
selecting vital love” and sensory feelings of pleasure. The strongest,
most  compelling  sort  of  bodily  shame  is  sexual  shame,  where  the
conflict is between sexual  love  (life-drive) and the sex  drive  (sensuous
drive)  or,  equivalently  between  a  vital  feeling  of  love  (not  to  be
confused with a spiritual feeling) and a sensory feeling of pleasure.44A
person experiences sexual shame when she finds her desire for sexual
pleasure to be at odds with her aspiration to sexual love.45 Spiritual
shame is, by contrast, the index of the tension between spiritual love
and the basic vital drive of preserving or augmenting the power of
living.  The capacity for  spiritual  shame is  confined to  persons,  i.e.,
those  who  have  the  spiritual  capacities  of  loving,  willing,  and
thinking.  
Summing up the contrast  between the two basic  forms of  shame,
Scheler writes:
Since  the  feeling  of  bodily  shame  presupposes  only  the
stratification of sensory and vital drive and feeling, but the
feeling of soulful shame presupposes the composition of a
spiritual  person,  the  former  [i.e.,  bodily  shame]  is  also
universally on hand, without exception, in human beings
and at every period of their development.  Indeed, traces of
it,  while  difficult  to  discern,  are  already  present  among
higher animals. By contrast, the feeling of soulful shame is
43 SCHELER 1957, 90.
44 Sexual  love is  the central,  defining expression  of  the  life-drive;  hence the distinction
between them.  Since even sexual love is selective and value-driven, it is distinct from
expressions of needs and pursuits of fulfilling needs that are common to the species. In
Scheler’s view, spiritual love is on a different level altogether.   
45 Scheler gives a detailed, speculative account of the emergence of these conditions for
sexual shame. The fundamental condition, specified by the other conditions, is a turn
toward individual over species-specific prioritizing.
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certainly not universally human, let alone on hand at every
stage of development of individuals and peoples.46
This  text  reminds  us  that  Scheler  prefaces  his  account  of  the  pre-
conditions of bodily shame with speculations on the development of
the life-world (Lebewelt) in general, with musings about the differences
between  plant  and  animal  forms  of  propagation  as  well  as  the
decisiveness of sexual differentiation.47 In this way, he argues for the
naturalness and universality of the phenomenon of bodily shame. This
claim is certainly not above controversy, depending – not least – upon
how that shame is conceived and how the criteria for identifying traces
of it in the animal kingdom are determined. But what is even more
controversial  is  the  apparent  denial  in  this  text  of  the  presence  of
spiritual  shame  across  peoples.  Given  the  superior  value  that  he
attaches to the capacity for spiritual love and shame, it is hard to see
how this denial, unsupported as it is, does not amount to a chauvinist
rant.
These criticisms notwithstanding, Scheler’s differentiation of the two
basic forms of shame, corresponding to two different sorts of feelings,
undoubtedly captures a basic gradient of feelings of shame, ranging
from types of bodily shame to types of spiritual shame. The former are
feelings unmistakably rooted in our sense of being more and, indeed,
being more for others than our bodies alone can reveal. The latter are
feelings of shame that spring from a sense of being more than our lives
alone  can  reveal.  It  is  one  thing  to  feel  ashamed  for  making  an
untoward sexual advance, quite another to feel ashamed for willfully
betraying a friend’s confidence. 
3.  Explaining shame: summing up Scheler’s model
According to Scheler, shame is a feeling that is directed at some self for
46 SCHELER 1957, 91.
47 SCHELER 1957, 70.
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being or acting a certain way.  The self at which it is directed may be
myself or someone else (I am ashamed of myself or for ( für) someone
else), but always (a) as someone individual and yet universal, and (b)
in the face of (in the eyes of,  vor) myself and/or others.48 The feeling
itself  is  born  of  the  tension  between  two  inherent  but  conflicting
aspects of the self in question, i.e., a value-directed aspect and value-
indifferent  aspect  –  the  former  an  individual  property  of  someone
capable of love, the latter a generic property. The feeling combines a
positive  feeling of  the  worth  of  the  self  as  an individual  and  thus
capable  of  love,  a  feeling  of  the  need  and capacity  to  protect  that
worth,  and  an  anxiousness  –  at  times  even  pleasant  anxiousness  –
about  the  undecided  outcome of  the  person’s  conflicted  state.  The
feeling  takes  place  precisely  when  attention  shifts  back  from  some
common behavior or generic aspect of a person to her worth as an
individual, capable of love. 
Why  do  we  experience  shame?  We  experience  shame  to  protect
ourselves from ourselves or, to put it less paradoxically, to safeguard
our better selves from our lesser selves. Shame is the feeling born of
anxiety of losing ourselves (and thus a capacity to love) to what is not
uniquely  ours,  whether  in  the  form  of  generic,  biological  urges,
common to  every  animal,  or  in  the  form  of  social  institutions  and
practices that we have not made our own.
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